Verified Progress Tracking for Timely Dataflow by Brun, Matthias et al.
Verified Progress Tracking for Timely Dataflow
Matthias Brun !
Department of Computer Science, ETH Zürich, Switzerland
Sára Decova
Department of Computer Science, ETH Zürich, Switzerland
Andrea Lattuada !
Department of Computer Science, ETH Zürich, Switzerland
Dmitriy Traytel !
Department of Computer Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Abstract
Large-scale stream processing systems often follow the dataflow paradigm, which enforces a
program structure that exposes a high degree of parallelism. The Timely Dataflow distributed system
supports expressive cyclic dataflows for which it offers low-latency data- and pipeline-parallel stream
processing. To achieve high expressiveness and performance, Timely Dataflow uses an intricate
distributed protocol for tracking the computation’s progress. We modeled the progress tracking
protocol as a combination of two independent transition systems in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant.
We specified and verified the safety of the two components and of the combined protocol. To this
end, we identified abstract assumptions on dataflow programs that are sufficient for safety and were
not previously formalized.
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1 Introduction
The dataflow programming model represents a program as a directed graph of interconnected
operators that perform per-tuple data transformations. A message (an incoming datum)
arrives at an input (a root of the dataflow) and flows along the graph’s edges into operators.
Each operator takes the message, processes it, and emits any resulting derived messages.
This model enables automatic and seamless parallelization of tasks on large multiprocessor
systems and cluster-scale deployments. Many research-oriented and industry-grade systems
have employed this model to describe a variety of large scale data analytics and processing
tasks. Dataflow programming models with timestamp-based, fine-grained coordination, also
called time-aware dataflow [24], incur significantly less intrinsic overhead [26].
© Matthias Brun, Sára Decova, Andrea Lattuada, and Dmitriy Traytel;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY 4.0
12th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2021).
Editors: Liron Cohen and Cezary Kaliszyk; Article No. 10; pp. 10:1–10:20
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
10:2 Verified Progress Tracking for Timely Dataflow
In a time-aware dataflow system, all messages are associated with a timestamp, and
operator instances need to know up-to-date (timestamp) frontiers – lower bounds on what
timestamps may still appear as their inputs. When informed that all data for a range of
timestamps has been delivered, an operator instance can complete the computation on input
data for that range of timestamps, produce the resulting output, and retire those timestamps.
A progress tracking mechanism is a core component of the dataflow system. It receives
information on outstanding timestamps from operator instances, exchanges this information
with other system workers (cores, nodes) and disseminates up-to-date approximations of the
frontiers to all operator instances.
The progress tracking mechanism must be correct. Incorrect approximations of the
frontiers can result in subtle concurrency errors, which may only appear under certain load
and deployment circumstances. In this work, we formally model in Isabelle/HOL and prove
the safety of the progress tracking protocol of Timely Dataflow [1, 26, 27] (Section 2), a
time-aware dataflow programming model and a state-of-the-art streaming, data-parallel,
distributed data processor.
In Timely Dataflow’s progress tracking, worker-local and distributed coordination are
intertwined, and the formal model must account for this asymmetry. Individual agents
(operator instances) on a worker generate coordination updates that have to be asynchronously
exchanged with all other workers, and then propagated locally on the dataflow structure to
provide local coordination information to all other operator instances.
This is an additional (worker-local) dimension in the specification when compared to
well-known distributed coordination protocols, such as Paxos [21] and Raft [28], which focus
on the interaction between symmetric communicating parties on different nodes. In contrast
our environment model can be simpler, as progress tracking is designed to handle but not
recover from fail-stop failures or unbounded pauses: upon crashes, unbounded stalls, or reset
of a channel, the system stops without violating safety.
Abadi et al. [4] formalize and prove safety of the distributed exchange component of
progress tracking in the TLA+ Proof System. We present their clocks protocol through the lens
of our Isabelle re-formalization (Section 3) and show that it subtly fails to capture behaviors
supported by Timely Dataflow [26, 27]. We then significantly extend the formalized protocol
(Section 4) to faithfully model Timely Dataflow’s modern reference implementation [1].
The above distributed protocol does not model the dataflow graph, operators, and
timestamps within a worker. Thus, on its own it is insufficient to ensure that up-to-date
frontiers are delivered to all operator instances. To this end, we formalize and prove the
safety of the local propagation component (Section 5) of progress tracking, which computes
and updates frontiers for all operator instances. Local propagation happens on a single
worker, but operator instances act as independent asynchronous actors. For this reason, we
also employ a state machine model for this component. Along the way, we identify sufficient
criteria on dataflow graphs, that were previously not explicitly (or only partially) formulated
for Timely Dataflow.
Finally, we combine the distributed component with local propagation (Section 6) and
formalize the global safety property that connects initial timestamps to their effect on the op-
erator frontier. Specifically, we prove that our combined protocol ensures that frontiers always
constitute safe lower bounds on what timestamps may still appear on the operator inputs.
Related Work
Data management systems verification. Timely Dataflow is a system that supports low-
latency, high-throughput data-processing applications. Higher level libraries [24, 25] and
SQL abstractions [2] built on Timely Dataflow support high performance incremental view
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maintenance for complex queries over large datasets. Verification and formal methods efforts
in the data management and processing space have focused on SQL and query-language
semantics [6, 11,13] and on query runtimes in database management systems [7, 23].
Distributed systems verification. Timely Dataflow is a distributed, concurrent system:
our modeling and proof techniques are based on the widely accepted state machine model
and refinement approach as used, e.g., in the TLA+ Proof System [10] and Ironfleet [16].
Recent work focuses on proving consistency and safety properties of distributed storage
systems [14, 15, 22] and providing tools for the implementation and verification of general
distributed protocols [20, 31] leveraging domain-specific languages [30, 33] and advanced
type systems [17].
Model of Timely Dataflow. Abadi and Isard [3] define abstractly the semantics of a Timely
Dataflow programming model [26]. Our work is complementary; we concretely compute their
could-result-in relation (Section 6) and formally model the implementation’s core component.
2 Timely Dataflow and Progress Tracking
Our formal model follows the progress tracking protocol of the modern Rust implementation
of Timely Dataflow [1]. The protocol has evolved from the one reported as part of the classic
implementation Naiad [26]. Here, we provide an informal overview of the basic notions, for
the purpose of supporting the presentation of our formal model and proofs.
Dataflow graph. A Timely Dataflow computation is represented by a graph of operators,
connected by channels. Each worker in the system runs an instance of the entire dataflow
graph. Each instance of an operator is responsible for a subset, or shard, of the data being
processed. Workers run independently and only communicate through reliable message
queues – they act as communicating sequential processes [18]. Each worker alternately
executes the progress tracking protocol and the operator’s processing logic. Figure 1 shows a









Figure 1 A Timely Dataflow operator.
Pointstamps. A pointstamp represents a datum at rest at an operator, or in motion on one
of the channels. A pointstamp pl, tq refers to a location l in the dataflow and a timestamp t.
Timestamps encode a semantic (causal) grouping of the data. For example, all data resulting
from a single transaction can be associated with the same timestamp. Timestamps are usually
tuples of positive integers, but can be of any type for which a partial order ⪯ is defined.
Locations and summaries. Each operator has an arbitrary number of input and output
ports, which are locations. An operator instance receives new data through its input
ports, or target locations, performs processing, and produces data through its output ports,
or source locations. A dataflow channel is an edge from a source to a target. Internal
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Figure 2 A timely dataflow that computes weakly connected components.
operator connections are edges from a target to a source, which are additionally described by
one or more summaries: the minimal increment to timestamps applied to data processed
by the operator.
Frontiers. Operator instances must be informed of which timestamps they may still receive
from their incoming channels, to determine when they have a complete view of data associated
with a certain timestamp. The progress tracking protocol tracks the system’s pointstamps
and summarizes them to one frontier per operator port. A frontier is a lower bound on the
timestamps that may appear at the operator instance inputs. It is represented by an antichain
F indicating that the operator may still receive any timestamp t for which Dt1 P F. t1 ⪯ t.
Progress tracking. Progress tracking computes frontiers in two steps. A distributed
component exchanges pointstamp changes (Sections 3 and 4) to construct an approximate,
conservative view of all the pointstamps present in the system. Workers use this global view
to locally propagate changes on the dataflow graph (Section 5) and update the frontiers at
the operator input ports. The combined protocol (Section 6) asynchronously executes these
two components.
▶ Running Example (Weakly Connected Components by Propagating Labels). Figure 2 shows
a dataflow that computes weakly connected components (WCC) by assigning integer labels
to vertices in a graph, and propagating the lowest label seen so far by each vertex to
all its neighbors. The input graph is initially sent by operator a as a stream of edges
(s,d) with timestamp (0,0). Each input port has an associated sharding function to
determine which data should be sent to which operator instance: port b.2 shards the
incoming edges (s,d) by s.
The input operator a will continue sending additional edges in the graph as they appear,
using increasing timestamps by incrementing one coordinate: (1,0), (2,0), etc. The compu-
tation is tasked with reacting to these changes and performing incremental re-computation to
produce correct output for each of these input graph versions. The first timestamp coordinate
represents logical consistency boundaries for the input and output of the program. We will use
the second timestamp coordinate to track the progress of the unbounded iterative algorithm.
The operator a starts with a pointstamp (a.1, (0,0)) on port a.1, representing its intent
to send data with that timestamp through the connected channel. When it sends messages
on channel A, these are represented by pointstamps on the port b.2 ; e.g., (b.2, (0,0)) for the
initial timestamp (0,0). When it ceases sending data for a certain timestamp, e.g., (0,0),
operator a drops the corresponding pointstamp on port a.1. The frontier at b.2 reflects
whether pointstamps with a certain timestamp are present at either a.1 or b.2 : when they
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both become absent (when all messages are delivered) each instance of b notices that its
frontier has advanced and determines it has received its entire share of the input (the graph)
for a timestamp.
Each instance of b starts with a pointstamp on b.3 at timestamp (0,0); when it has
received its entire share of the input, for each vertex with label x and each of its neighbors n,
it sends (n,x) at timestamp (0,0). This stream then traverses operator c, that increases
the timestamp associated to each message by (0,1), and reaches port b.1, which shards the
incoming tuples (n,x) by n. Operator b inspects the frontier on b.1 to determine when it
has received all messages with timestamp (0,1). These messages left b.3 with timestamp
(0,0). The progress tracking mechanism will correctly report the frontier at b.1 by taking
into consideration the summary between c.1 and c.2.
Operator b collects all label updates from b.1 and, for those vertices that received a value
that is smaller than the current label, it updates internal state and sends a new update via b.3
with timestamp (0,1). This process then repeats with increasing timestamps, (0,2), (0,3),
etc., for each trip around the loop, until ultimately no new update message is generated on
port b.3 by any of the operator instances, for a certain family of timestamps (t1,t2) with a
fixed t1 corresponding to the input version being considered. Operator b determines it has
correctly labeled all connected components for a given t1 when the frontier at b.1 does not
contain a pt1, t2q such that t2 ⪯ the graph’s diameter. In practice, once operator b determines
it has computed the output for a given t1, the operator would also send the output on an
additional outgoing channel to deliver it to the user. Later, operator b continues processing
for further input versions, indicated by increasing t1, with timestamps (t1,0), (t1,1), etc. ◀
3 The Clocks Protocol
In this section, we present Abadi et al.’s approach to modeling the distributed component
of progress tracking [4], termed the clocks protocol. Instead of showing their TLA+ Proof
System formalization, we present our re-formalization of the protocol in Isabelle. Thereby,
this section serves as an introduction to both the protocol and the relevant Isabelle constructs.
The clocks protocol is a distributed algorithm to track existing pointstamps in a dataflow.
It models a finite set of workers. Each worker stores a (finite) multiset of pointstamps as
seen from its perspective and shares updates to this information with all other workers.
The protocol considers workers as black boxes, i.e., it does not model their dataflow graph,
locations, and timestamps. We extend the protocol to take these components into account in
Section 5.
In Isabelle, we use the type variable 'w :: finite to represent workers. We assume that
'w belongs to the finite type class, which assures that 'w’s universe is finite. Similarly, we
model pointstamps abstractly by 'p :: order . The order type class assumes the existence of a
partial order ď :: 'p ñ 'p ñ bool (and the corresponding strict order ă).
We model the protocol as a transition system that acts on configurations given as follows:
record p'w :: finite, 'p :: orderq conf “
rec :: 'p zmset
msg :: 'w ñ 'w ñ 'p zmset list
temp :: 'w ñ 'p zmset
glob :: 'w ñ 'p zmset
Here, rec c denotes the global multiset of pointstamps (or records) that are present in
a system’s configuration c. We use the type 'p zmset of signed multisets [8]. An element
M :: 'p zmset can be thought of as a function of type 'p ñ int, which is non-zero only
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for finitely many values. (In contrast, an unsigned multiset M :: 'p mset corresponds to a
function of type 'p ñ nat.) Signed multisets enjoy nice algebraic properties; in particular,
they form a group. This significantly simplifies the reasoning about subtraction. However,
rec c will always store only non-negative pointstamp counts. The other components of a
configuration c are
the progress message queues msg c w w1, which denote the progress update messages sent
from worker w to worker w1 (not to be confused with data messages, which are accounted
for in rec c but do not participate in the protocol otherwise);
the temporary changes temp c w in which worker w stores changes to pointstamps that it
might need to communicate to other workers; and
the local approximation glob c w of rec c from the perspective of worker w (we use Abadi
et al. [4]’s slightly misleading term glob for the worker’s local view on the global state).
In contrast to rec, these components may contain a negative count ´i for a pointstamp p,
which denotes that i occurrences of p have been discarded.
The following predicate characterizes the protocol’s initial configurations. We write
t#uz for the empty signed multiset and M #z p for the count of pointstamp p in a signed
multiset M.
definition Init :: p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
Init c “ p@p. rec c #z p ě 0q ^ p@w w1. msg c w w1 “ r sq ^
p@w. temp c w “ t#uzq ^ p@w. glob c w “ rec cq
In words: all global pointstamp counts in rec must be non-negative and equal to each worker’s
local view glob; all message queues and temporary changes must be empty.
Referencing our WCC example described in Section 2, the clocks protocol is the component
in charge of distributing pointstamp changes to other workers. When one instance of the
input operator a ceases sending data for a certain family of timestamps (t1,0) it drops the
corresponding pointstamp: the clocks protocol is in charge of exchanging this information
with other workers, so that they can determine when all instances of a have ceased producing
messages for a certain timestamp. This happens for all pointstamp changes in the system,
including pointstamps that represent messages in-flight on channels.
The configurations evolve via one of three actions:
perf_op: A worker may perform an operation that causes a change in pointstamps. Changes
may remove certain pointstamps and add others. They are recorded in rec and temp.
send_upd: A worker may broadcast some of its changes stored in temp to all other workers.
recv_upd: A worker may receive an earlier broadcast and update its local view glob.
Overall, the clocks protocol aims to establish that glob is a safe approximation for rec.
Safe means here that no pointstamp in rec is less than any of glob’s minimal pointstamps.
To achieve this property, the protocol imposes a restriction on which new pointstamps may
be introduced in rec and which progress updates may be broadcast. This restriction is the
uprightness property that ensures that a pointstamp can only be introduced if simultaneously
a smaller (supporting) pointstamp is removed. Formally, a signed multiset of pointstamps is
upright if every positive entry is accompanied by a smaller negative entry:
definition supp :: 'p zmset ñ 'p ñ bool where supp M p “ pDp1 ă p. M #z p1 ă 0q
definition upright :: 'p zmset ñ bool where upright M “ p@p. M #z p ą 0 ÝÑ supp M pq
Abadi et al. [4] additionally require that the pointstamp p1 in supp’s definition satisfies
@p2 ď p1. M #z p2 ď 0. The two variants of upright are equivalent in our formalization
because signed multisets are finite and thus minimal elements exist even without ď being
well-founded. The extra assumption on p1 is occasionally useful in proofs.
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definition perf_op ::'w ñ 'p mset ñ 'p mset ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
perf_op w ∆neg ∆pos c c1 “ let ∆ “ ∆pos´∆neg in p@p. ∆neg #p ď rec c#z pq^upright ∆^
c1 “ cLrec “ rec c`∆, temp “ ptemp cqpw :“ temp c w`∆qM
definition send_upd :: 'w ñ 'p set ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
send_upd w P c c1 “ let γ “ t#p P#z temp c w. p P P#u in
γ ‰ t#uz ^ upright ptemp c w´ γq ^
c1 “ cLmsg “ pmsg cqpw :“ λw1. msg c w w1 ¨ rγsq, temp “ ptemp cqpw :“ temp c w´ γqM
definition recv_upd :: 'w ñ 'w ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
recv_upd w w1 c c1 “ msg c w w1 ‰ rs ^
c1 “ cLmsg “ pmsg cqpw :“ pmsg c wqpw1 :“ tl pmsg c w w1qqq,
glob “ pglob cqpw1 :“ glob c w1 ` hd pmsg c w w1qqM
definition Next :: p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
Next c c1 “ pc “ c1q _ pDw ∆neg ∆pos. perf_op w ∆neg ∆pos c c1q _
pDw P. send_upd w P c c1q _ pDw w1. recv_upd w w1 c c1q
Figure 3 Transition relation of Abadi et al.’s clocks protocol.
In practice, uprightness means that operators are only allowed to transition to pointstamps
forward in time, and cannot re-introduce pointstamps that they relinquished. This is necessary
to ensure that the frontiers always move to later timestamps and remain a conservative
approximation of the pointstamps still present in the system. An advancing frontier triggers
computation in some of the dataflow operators, for example to output the result of a time-
based aggregation: this should only happen once all the relevant incoming data has been
processed. This is the intuition behind the safety property of the protocol, Safe, discussed
later in this section.
Figure 3 defines the three protocol actions formally as transition relations between an old
configuration c and a new configuration c1 along with the definition of the overall transition
relation Next, which in addition to performing one of the actions may stutter, i.e., leave c1 “ c
unchanged. The three actions take further parameters as arguments, which we explain next.
The action perf_op is parameterized by a worker w and two (unsigned) multisets ∆neg
and ∆pos, corresponding to negative and positive pointstamp changes. The action’s overall
effect on the pointstamps is thus ∆ “ ∆pos ´∆neg. Here and elsewhere, subtraction expects
signed multisets as arguments and we omit the type conversions from unsigned to signed
multisets (which are included in our Isabelle formalization). The action is only enabled if its
parameters satisfy two requirements. First, only pointstamps present in rec may be dropped,
and thus the counts from ∆neg must be bounded by the ones from rec. (Arguably, accessing
rec is problematic for distributed workers. We rectify this modeling deficiency in Section 4.)
Second, ∆ must be upright, which ensures that we will never introduce a pointstamp that is
lower than any pointstamp in rec. If these requirements are met, the action can be performed
and will update both rec and temp with ∆ (expressed using Isabelle’s record and function
update syntax).
The action send_upd is parameterized by a worker (sender w) and a set of pointstamps
P, the outstanding changes to which, called γ, we want to broadcast. The key requirement
is that the still unsent changes remain upright. Note that it is always possible to send all
changes or all positive changes in temp, because any multiset without a positive change is
upright. The operation enqueues γ in all message queues that have w as the sender. We
model first-in-first-out queues as lists, where enqueuing means appending at the end (_ ¨ r_s).
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Finally, the action recv_upd is parameterized by two workers (sender w and receiver w1).
Given a non-empty queue msg c w w1, the action dequeues the first message (head hd gives
the message, tail tl the queue’s remainder) and adds it to the receiver’s glob.
An execution of the clocks protocol is an infinite sequence of configurations. Infinite
sequences of elements of type 'a are expressed in Isabelle using the coinductive datatype
(short codatatype) of streams defined as codatatype 'a stream “ Stream 'a p'a streamq.
We can inspect a stream’s head and tail using the functions shd :: 'a stream ñ 'a and
stl :: 'a stream ñ 'a stream. Valid protocol executions satisfy the predicate Spec, i.e., they
start in an initial configuration and all neighboring configurations are related by Next:
definition Spec :: p'w, 'pq conf stream ñ bool where
Spec s “ now Init s^ alw prelates Nextq s
The operators now and relates lift unary and binary predicates over configurations to exe-
cutions by evaluating them on the first one or two configurations respectively: now P s “
P pshd sq and relates R s “ R pshd sq pshd pstl sqq. The coinductive operator alw resembles a
temporal logic operator: alw P s holds if P holds for all suffixes of s.
coinductive alw :: p'a stream ñ boolq ñ 'a stream ñ bool where
P s ÝÑ alw P pstl sq ÝÑ alw P s
We use the operators now, relates, and alw not only to specify valid execution, but also
to state the main safety property. Moreover, we use the predicate vacant to express that a
pointstamp (and all smaller pointstamps) are not present in a signed multiset:
definition vacant :: 'p zmset ñ 'p ñ bool where vacant M p “ p@p1 ď p. M #z p1 “ 0q
Safety states that if any worker’s glob becomes vacant up to some pointstamp, then that
pointstamp and any lesser ones do not exist in the system, i.e., are not present in rec (and
will remain so). Thus, safety allows workers to learn locally, via glob, something about the
system’s global state rec, namely that they will never encounter certain pointstamps again.
Formally:
definition Safe :: p'w, 'pq conf stream ñ bool where
Safe s “ p@w p. now pλc. vacant pglob c wq pq s ÝÑ alw pnow pλc. vacant prec cq pq sqq
lemma safe: Spec s ÝÑ alw Safe s
Our extended report [9] provides informal proof sketches for this and other safety properties.
Overall, we have replicated the formalization of Abadi et al.’s clocks protocol and the
proof of its safety. Their protocol accurately models the implementation of the progress
tracking protocol’s distributed component in Timely Dataflow’s original implementation
Naiad with one subtle exception. The Naiad API (OnNotify, SendBy) allows an operator
to repeatedly send data messages through its output port, which generates pointstamps at
the receiver, without requiring that a pointstamp on the output port is decremented. This
can result in a perf_op transition that is not upright. Additionally, the modern reference
implementation of Timely Dataflow in Rust is more expressive than Naiad, and permits
multiple operations that result in non-upright changes. We address and correct this limitation
of the clocks protocol in Section 4.
One example of an operator that expresses behavior that results in non-upright changes
is the input operator a in the WCC example. This operator may be reading data from an
external source, and as soon as it receives new edges, it can forward them with the current
pointstamp (a.1, (t1,0)). This operator may be invoked multiple times, and perform this
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action repeatedly, until it determines from the external source that it should mark a certain
timestamp as complete by dropping the pointstamp. All of these intermediate actions that
send data at (t1,0) are not upright, as sending messages creates new pointstamps on the
message targets, without dropping a smaller pointstamp that can support the postive change.
4 Exchanging Progress
As outlined in the previous section, the clocks protocol is not flexible enough to capture
executions with non-upright changes, which are desired and supported by concrete implemen-
tations of Timely Dataflow. At the same time, the protocol captures behaviors that are not
reasonable in practice. Specifically, the clocks protocol does not separate the worker-local
state from the system’s global state. The perf_op transition, which is meant to be executed
by a single worker, uses the global state to check whether the transition is enabled and
simultaneously updates the global state rec as part of the transition. In particular, a single
perf_op transition allows a worker to drop a pointstamp that in the real system “belongs”
to a different worker w and simultaneously consistently updates w’s state. In concrete
implementations of Timely Dataflow, workers execute perf_op’s asynchronously, and thus
can only base the transition on information that is locally available to them.
Our modified model of the protocol, called exchange, resolves both issues. As the first step,
we split the rec field into worker-local signed multisets caps of pointstamps, which we call
capabilities as they indicate the possibility for the respective worker to emit these pointstamps.
Workers may transfer capabilities to other workers. To do so, they asynchronously send
capabilities as data messages to a central multiset data of pairs of workers (receivers) and
pointstamps. We arrive at the following updated type of configurations:
record p'w :: finite, 'p :: orderq conf “
caps :: 'w ñ 'p zmset
data :: p'w ˆ 'pq mset
msg :: 'w ñ 'w ñ 'p zmset list
temp :: 'w ñ 'p zmset
glob :: 'w ñ 'p zmset
Including this fine-grained view on pointstamps will allow workers to make transitions based
on worker-local information. The entirety of the system’s pointstamps, rec, which was
previously part of the configuration and which the protocol aims to track, can be computed
as the sum of all the workers’ capabilities and data’s in-flight pointstamps.
definition rec :: p'w, 'pq conf ñ 'p zmset where rec c “ p
ÿ
w
caps c wq ` snd ‘# data c
Here, the infix operator ‘# denotes the image of a function over a multiset with resulting
counts given by p f ‘# Mq# x “
ř
yPtyP#M| f y“xu M # y.
The exchange protocol’s initial state allows workers to start with some positive capabilities.
Each worker’s glob must correctly reflect all initially present capabilities.
definition Init :: p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
Init c “ p@w p. caps c w #z p ě 0q ^ data c “ t#u ^
p@w w1. msg c w w1 “ r sq ^ p@w. temp c w “ t#uzq ^ p@w. glob c w “ rec cq
The transition relation of the exchange protocol, shown in Figure 4, is similar to that of the
clocks protocol. We focus on the differences between the two protocols. First, the exchange
protocol has an additional transition recv_cap to receive a previously sent capability. The
transition removes a pointstamp from data and adds it to the receiving worker’s capabilities.
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definition recv_cap :: 'w ñ 'p ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
recv_cap w p c c1 “ pw, pq P# data c^
c1 “ cLcaps “ pcaps cqpw :“ caps c w` t#p#uzq, data “ data c´ t#pw, pq#uM
definition perf_op :: 'w ñ 'p mset ñ p'w ˆ 'pq mset ñ 'p mset ñ
p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
perf_op w ∆neg ∆data ∆self c c1 “
p∆data ‰ t#u _∆self ´∆neg ‰ t#uzq ^ p@p. ∆neg # p ď caps c w #z pq ^
p@pw1, pq P# ∆data. Dp1 ă p. caps c w #z p1 ą 0q ^
p@p P# ∆self . Dp1 ď p. caps c w #z p1 ą 0q ^
c1 “ cLcaps “ pcaps cqpw :“ caps c w`∆self ´∆negq, data “ data c`∆data,
temp “ ptemp cqpw :“ temp c w` psnd ‘# ∆data `∆self ´∆negqqM
definition send_upd :: 'w ñ 'p set ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
send_upd w P c c1 “ let γ “ t#p P#z temp c w. p P P#u in
γ ‰ t#uz ^ justified pcaps c wq ptemp c w´ γq ^
c1 “ cLmsg “ pmsg cqpw :“ λw1. msg c w w1 ¨ rγsq, temp “ ptemp cqpw :“ temp c w´ γqM
definition recv_upd :: 'w ñ 'w ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
recv_upd w w1 c c1 “ msg c w w1 ‰ rs ^
c1 “ cLmsg “ pmsg cqpw :“ pmsg c wqpw1 :“ tl pmsg c w w1qqq,
glob “ pglob cqpw1 :“ glob c w1 ` hd pmsg c w w1qqM
definition Next :: p'w, 'pq conf ñ p'w, 'pq conf ñ bool where
Next c c1 “ pc “ c1q _ pDw p. recv_cap w p c c1q _
pDw ∆neg ∆data ∆self . perf_op w ∆neg ∆data ∆self c c1q _
pDw P. send_upd w P c c1q _ pDw w1. recv_upd w w1 c c1q
Figure 4 Transition relation of the exchange protocol.
The perf_op transition resembles its homonymous counterpart from the clocks protocol.
Yet, the information flow is more fine grained. In particular, the transition is parameterized
by a worker w and three multisets of pointstamps. As in the clocks protocol, the multiset
∆neg represents negative changes to pointstamps. Only pointstamps for which w owns a
capability in caps may be dropped in this way. The other two multisets ∆data and ∆self
represent positive changes. The multiset ∆data represents positive changes to other workers’
capabilities – the receiving worker is stored in ∆data. These changes are not immediately
applied to the other worker’s caps, but are sent via the data field. The multiset ∆self
represents positive changes to w’s capabilities, which are applied immediately applied to
w’s caps. The separation between ∆data and ∆self is motivated by different requirements
on these positive changes to pointstamps that we prove to be sufficient for safety. To send
a positive capability to another worker, w is required to hold a positive capability for a
strictly smaller pointstamp. In contrast, w can create a new capability for itself, if it is
already holding a capability for the very same (or a smaller) pointstamp. In other words, w
can arbitrarily increase the multiset counts of its own capabilities. Note that, unlike in the
clocks protocol, there is no requirement of uprightness and, in fact, workers are not required
to perform negative changes at all. Of course, it is useful for workers to perform negative
changes every now and then so that the overall system can make progress.
The first condition in perf_op, namely ∆data ‰ t#u _∆self ´∆neg ‰ t#uz, ensures that
the transition changes the configuration. In the exchange protocol, we also include explicit
stutter steps in the Next relation (c “ c1) but avoid them in the individual transitions.
M. Brun, S. Decova, A. Lattuada, and D. Traytel 10:11
locale graph “
fixes weights :: p'vtx :: finiteq ñ 'vtx ñ p'lbl :: torder , monoid_adduq antichain
assumes pl :: 'lblq ě 0 and pl1 :: 'lblq ď l3 ÝÑ l2 ď l4 ÝÑ l1 ` l2 ď l3 ` l4
and weights l l “ tu
locale dataflow “ graph summary
for summary :: p'l :: finiteq ñ 'l ñ p'sum :: torder , monoid_adduq antichain `
fixes h :: p't :: orderq ñ 'sum ñ 't
assumes th 0 “ t and pth sqh s1 “ thps` s1q and t ď t1 ÝÑ s ď s1 ÝÑ th s ď t1h s1
and path l l xs ÝÑ xs ‰ r s ÝÑ t ă t h p
ÿ
xsq
Figure 5 Locales for graphs and dataflows.
Sending (send_upd) and receiving (recv_upd) progress updates works precisely as in the
clocks protocol except for the condition on what remains in the sender’s temp highlighted
in gray in Figure 4. Because we allowed perf_op to perform non-upright changes, we can
no longer expect the contents of temp to be upright. Instead, we use the predicate justified,
which offers three possible justifications for positive entries in the signed multiset M (in
contrast to upright’s sole justification of being supported in M):
definition justified :: 'p zmset ñ 'p zmset ñ bool where
justified C M “ p@p. M#z p ą 0 ÝÑ supp M p_pDp1 ă p. C#z p1 ą 0q_M#z p ă C#z pq
Thus, a positive count for pointstamp p in M may be either
supported in M, i.e., in particular every upright change is justified, or
justified by a smaller pointstamp in C, which we think of as the sender’s capabilities, or
justified by p in C, with the requirement that p’s count in M is smaller than p’s count in
C.
The definitions of valid executions Spec and the safety predicate Safe are unchanged
compared to the clocks protocol. Also, we prove precisely the same safety property safe
following a similar proof structure.
We also derive the following additional property of glob, which shows that any in-flight
progress updates to a pointstamp p, positive or negative, have a corresponding positive count
for some pointstamp less or equal than p in the receiver’s glob.
lemma glob: Spec s ÝÑ alw pnow pλc. @w w1 p.
pDM P set pmsg c w w1q. p P#z Mq ÝÑ pDp1 ď p. glob c w1 #z p1 ą 0qqq s
5 Locally Propagating Progress
The previous sections focused on the progress-relevant communication between workers and
abstracted over the actual dataflow that is evaluated by each worker. Next, we refine this
abstraction: we model the actual dataflow graph as a weighted directed graph with vertices
representing operator input and output ports, termed locations. We do not distinguish
between source and target locations and thus also not between internal and dataflow edges.
Each weight denotes a minimum increment that is performed to a timestamp when it
conceptually travels along the corresponding edge from one location to another. On a single
worker, progress updates can be communicated locally, so that every operator learns which
timestamps it may still receive in the future. We formalize Timely Dataflow’s approach for
this local communication: the algorithm gradually propagates learned pointstamp changes
along dataflow edges to update downstream frontiers.
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Figure 5 details our modeling of graphs and dataflows, which uses locales [5] to capture
our abstract assumptions on dataflows and timestamps. A locale lets us fix parameters (types
and constants) and assume properties about them. In our setting, a weighted directed graph
is given by a finite (class finite) type 'vtx of vertices and a weights function that assigns each
pair of vertices a weight. To express weights, we fix a type of labels 'lbl, which we assume
to be partially ordered (class order) and to form a monoid (class monoid_add) with the
monoid operation ` and the neutral element 0. We assume that labels are non-negative
and that ` on labels is monotone with respect to the partial order ď. A weight is then an
antichain of labels, that is a set of incomparable (with respect to ď) labels, which we model
as follows:
typedef p't :: orderq antichain “ tA :: 't set. finite A^ p@a P A. @b P A. a ­ă b^ b ­ă aqu
We use standard set notation for antichains and omit type conversions from antichains to
(signed) multisets. The empty antichain tu is a valid weight, too, in which case we think of
the involved vertices as not being connected to each other. Thus, the graph locale’s final
assumption expresses the non-existence of self-edges in a graph.
Within the graph locale, we can define the predicate path :: 'vtx ñ 'vtx ñ 'lbl list ñ bool.
Intuitively, path v w xs expresses that the list of labels xs is a valid path from v to w (the
empty list being a valid path only if v “ w and any weight l P weights u v can extend a valid
path from v to w to a path from u to w). We omit path’s formal straightforward inductive
definition. Note that even though self-edges are disallowed, cycles in graphs are possible
(and desired). In other words, path v v xs can be true for a non-empty list xs.
The second locale, dataflow, has two purposes. First, it refines the generic graph ter-
minology from vertices and labels to locations ('l) and summaries ('sum), which is the
corresponding terminology used in Timely Dataflow. Second, it introduces the type for
timestamps 't, which is partially ordered (class order) and an operation h (read as “results
in”) that applies a summary to a timestamp to obtain a new timestamp. We chose the
asymmetric symbol for the operation to remind the reader that its two arguments have
different types, timestamps and summaries. The locale requires the operation h to be
well-behaved with respect to the available vocabulary on summaries (0, `, and ď). Moreover,
it requires that proper cycles xs have a path summary
ř
xs (defined by iterating `) that
strictly increments any timestamp t.
Now, consider a function P :: 'l ñ 't zmset that assigns each location a set of timestamps
that it currently holds. We are interested in computing a lower bound of timestamps (with
respect to the order ď) that may arrive at any location for a given P. Timely Dataflow calls
antichains that constitute such a lower bound frontiers. Formally, a frontier is the set of
minimal incomparable elements that have a positive count in a signed multiset of timestamps.
definition antichain_of :: 't set ñ 't set where antichain_of A “ tx P A. ␣Dy P A. y ă xu
lift_definition frontier :: 't zmset ñ 't antichain is λM. antichain_of tt. M #z t ą 0u
Our frontier of interest, called the implied frontier, at location l can be computed directly
for a given function P by adding, for every location l 1, every (minimal) possible path summary
between l 1 and l, denoted by the antichain path_summary l 1 l, to every timestamp present at
l 1 and computing the frontier of the result. Formally, we first lift h to signed multisets and
antichains. Then, we use the lifted operator
È
to define the implied frontier.
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definition change_multiplicity :: 'l ñ 't ñ int ñ p'l , 'tq conf ñ p'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
change_multiplicity l t n c c1 “ n ‰ 0^ pDt1 P frontier pimplications c lq. t1 ď tq ^
c1 “ cLpts “ ppts cqpl :“ pts c l ` replicate n tq,
work “ pwork cqpl :“ work c l ` frontier ppts c1 lq ´ frontier ppts c lqqM
definition propagate :: 'l ñ 't ñ p'l , 'tq conf ñ p'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
propagate l t c c1 “ t P#z work c l ^ p@l 1. @t1 P#z work c l 1. ␣t1 ă tq ^
c1 “ cLimp “ pimp cqpl :“ imp c l ` replicate pwork c l #z tq t,
work “ λl 1. if l “ l 1 then t#t1 P#z work c l . t1 ‰ t#u
else work c l 1 ` ppfrontier pimp c1 lq ´ frontier pimp c lqq
è
summary l l 1qM
definition Next :: p'l , 'tq conf ñ p'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
Next c c1 “ pc “ c1q _ pDl t n. change_multiplicity l t n c c1q _ pDl t. propagate l t c c1q
Figure 6 Transition relation of the local progress propagation.
definition
è






pλt. t h sq ‘#z M
definition implied_frontier :: p'l ñ 't zmsetq ñ 'l ñ 't antichain where






Above and elsewhere, given a signed multiset M, we write f ‘#z M for the image (as a signed
multiset) of f over M and posz M for the signed multiset of M’s positive entries.
Computing the implied frontier for each location in this way (quadratic in the number of
locations) would be too inefficient, especially because we want to frequently supply operators
with up-to-date progress information. Instead, we follow the optimized approach implemented
in Timely Dataflow: after performing some work and making some progress, operators start
pushing relevant updates only to their immediate successors in the dataflow graph. The
information gradually propagates and eventually converges to the implied frontier. Despite
this local propagation not being a distributed protocol as such, we formalize it for a fixed
dataflow in a similar state-machine style as the earlier exchange protocol.
Local propagation uses a configuration consisting of three signed multiset components.
record p'l :: finite, 't :: tmonoid_add , orderuq conf “
pts :: 'l ñ 't zmset
imp :: 'l ñ 't zmset
work :: 'l ñ 't zmset
Following Timely Dataflow terminology, pointstamps pts are the present timestamps
grouped by location (the P function from above). The implications imp are the output of
the local propagation and contain an over-approximation of the implied frontier (as we will
show). Finally, the worklist work is an auxiliary data structure to store not-yet propagated
timestamps.
Initially, all implications are empty and worklists consist of the frontiers of the pointstamps.
definition Init :: p'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
Init c “ p@l . imp c l “ t#uz ^ work c l “ frontier ppts c lqq
The propagation proceeds by executing one of two actions shown in Figure 6. The action
change_multiplicity constitutes the algorithm’s information input: The system may have
changed the multiplicity of some timestamp t at location l and can use this action to notify
the propagation algorithm of the change. The change value n is required to be non-zero and
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the affected timestamp t must be witnessed by some timestamp in the implications. Note
that the latter requirement prohibits executing this action in the initial state. The action
updates the pointstamps according to the declared change. It also updates the worklist,
but only if the update of the pointstamps affects the frontier of the pointstamps at l and
moreover the worklists are updated merely by the change to the frontier.
The second action, propagate, applies the information for the timestamp t stored in the
worklist at a given location l, to the location’s implications (thus potentially enabling the first
action). It also updates the worklists at the location’s immediate successors in the dataflow
graph. Again the worklist updates are filtered by whether they affect the frontier (of the
implications) and are adjusted by the summary between l and each successor. Importantly,
only minimal timestamps (with respect to timestamps in worklists at all locations) may be
propagated, which ensures that any timestamp will eventually disappear from all worklists.
The overall transition relation Next allows us to choose between these two actions and a
stutter step. Together with Init, it gives rise to the predicate describing valid executions in
the standard way: Spec s “ now Init s^ alw prelates Nextq s.
We show that valid executions satisfy a safety invariant. Ideally, we would like to show
that for any t with a positive count in pts at location l and for any path summary s between
l and some location l1, there is a timestamp in the (frontier of the) implications at l1 that is
less than or equal to th s. In other words, the location l1 is aware that it may still encounter
timestamp th s. Stated as above, the invariant does not hold, due to the not-yet-propagated
progress information stored in the worklists. If some timestamp, however, does not occur
in any worklist (formalized by the below work_vacant predicate), we obtain our desired
invariant Safe.
definition work_vacant :: p'l , 'tq conf ñ 't ñ bool where
work_vacant c t “ p@l l1 s t1. t1 P#z work c l ÝÑ s P path_summary l l1 ÝÑ t1 h s ę tq
definition Safe :: p'l , 'tq conf stream ñ bool where
Safe c “ p@l l1 t s. pts c l #z t ą 0^ s P path_summary l l1 ^ work_vacant c pt h sq ÝÑ
pDt1 P frontier pimp c l1q. t1 ď t h sqq
lemma safe: Spec s ÝÑ alw pnow Safeq s
In our running WCC example, Safe is for example necessary to determine once operator b
has received all incoming updates for a certain round of label propagation, which is encoded
as a timestamp (t1,t2). If a pointstamp at port b.3 was not correctly reflected in the frontier
at b.1 the operator may incorrectly determine that it has seen all incoming labels for a
certain graph node and proceed to the next round of propagation. Safe states, that this
cannot happen and all pointstamps are correctly reflected in relevant downstream frontiers.
The safety proof relies on two auxiliary invariants. First, implications have only positive
entries. Second, the sum of the implication and the worklist at a given location l is equal to the
sum of the frontier of the pointstamps at l and the sum of all frontiers of the implications of
all immediate predecessor locations l1 (adjusted by the corresponding summary summary l1 l).
While the above safety property is sufficient to prove safety of the combination of the
local propagation and the exchange protocol in the next section, we also establish that the
computed frontier of the implications converges to the implied frontier. Specifically, the two
frontiers coincide for timestamps which are not contained in any of the worklists.
lemma implied_frontier: Spec s ÝÑ alw pnow pλc. work_vacant c t ÝÑ
p@l. t P frontier pimp c lq ÐÑ t P implied_frontier ppts cq lqqq s
M. Brun, S. Decova, A. Lattuada, and D. Traytel 10:15
6 Progress Tracking
We are now ready to combine the two parts presented so far: the between-worker exchange
of progress updates (Section 4) and the worker-local progress propagation (Section 5).
The combined protocol takes pointstamp changes and determines per-location frontiers
at each operator on each worker. It operates on configurations consisting of a single
exchange protocol configuration (referred to with the prefix E) and for each worker a local
propagation configuration (prefix P) and a Boolean flag indicating whether the worker has
been properly initialized.
record p'w :: finite, 'l :: finite, 't :: tmonoid_add , orderuq conf “
exch :: p'w, 'l ˆ 'tq E .conf
prop :: 'w ñ p'l , 'tq P .conf
init :: 'w ñ bool
As pointstamps in the exchange protocol, we use pairs of locations and timestamps. To order
pointstamps, we use the following could-result-in relation, inspired by Abadi and Isard [3].
definition ďcri where pl, tq ďcri pl1, t1q “ pDs P path_summary l l1. t h s ď t1q
As required by the exchange protocol, this definition yields a partial order. In particular,
antisymmetry follows from the assumption that proper cycles have a non-zero summary and
transitivity relies on the operation h being monotone. Intuitively, ďcri captures a notion of
reachability in the dataflow graph: as timestamp t traverses the graph starting at location l, it
could arrive at location l1, being incremented to timestamp t1. (In Timely Dataflow, an edge’s
summary represents the minimal increment to a timestamp when it traverses that edge.)
In an initial combined configuration, all workers are not initialized and all involved
configurations are initial. Moreover, the local propagation’s pointstamps coincide with
exchange protocol’s glob, which is kept invariant in the combined protocol.
definition Init :: p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
Init c “ p@w. init c w “ Falseq ^ E.Init pexch cq ^ p@w. P.Init pprop c wqq ^
p@w l t. P.pts pprop c wq l #z t “ E.glob pexch cq w #z pl, tqq
Figure 7 shows the combined protocol’s transition relation Next. Most actions have
identical names as the exchange protocol’s actions and they mostly perform the corresponding
actions on the exchange part of the configuration. In addition, the recv_upd action also
performs several change_multiplicity local propagation actions: the receiver updates the
state of its local propagation configuration for all received timestamp updates. The action
propagate does not have a counterpart in the exchange protocol. It iterates, using the
while_option combinator from Isabelle’s library, propagation on a single worker until all
worklists are empty. The term while_option b c s repeatedly applies c starting from the initial
state s, until the predicate b is satisfied. Overall, it evaluates to Some s1 satisfying ␣b s1 and
s1 “ c p¨ ¨ ¨ pc sqq with the least possible number of repetitions of c and to None if no such
state exists. Thus, it is only possible to take the propagate action, if the repeated propagation
terminates for the considered configuration. We believe that repeated propagation terminates
for any configuration, but we do not prove this non-obvious1 fact formally. Timely Dataflow
1 Because propagation must operate on a globally minimal timestamp and because loops in the dataflow
graph have a non-zero summary, repeated propagation will eventually forever remove any timestamp
from any worklist. However, it is not as obvious why it eventually will stop introducing larger and
larger timestamps in worklists. The termination argument must rely on the fact that only timestamps
that modify the frontier of the implications are ever added to worklists.
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definition recv_cap :: 'w ñ 'l ˆ 't ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
recv_cap w p c c1 “ E.recv_cap w p pexch cq pexch c1q ^ prop c1 “ prop c^ init c1 “ init c
definition perf_op :: 'w ñ p'l ˆ 'tq mset ñ p'w ˆ p'l ˆ 'tqq mset ñ p'l ˆ 'tq mset ñ
p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
perf_op w ∆neg ∆data ∆self c c1 “ E.perf_op w ∆neg ∆data ∆self pexch cq pexch c1q ^
prop c1 “ prop c^ init c1 “ init c
definition send_upd :: 'w ñ p'l ˆ 'tq set ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
send_upd w P c c1 “ E.send_upd pexch cq pexch c1q w P^ prop c1 “ prop c^ init c1 “ init c
definition cm_all :: p'l , 'tq P .conf ñ p'l ˆ 'tq zmset ñ p'l , 'tq P .conf where
cm_all c ∆ “ Set.fold pλpl, tq c. SOME c1. P.change_multiplicity c c1 l t p∆ #z pl, tqqq c
tpl, tq. pl, tq P#z ∆u
definition recv_upd :: 'w ñ 'w ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
recv_upd w w1 c c1 “ init c w1 ^ E.recv_upd w t pexch cq pexch c1q ^
prop c1 “ pprop cqpw1 :“ cm_all pprop c w1q phd pE.msg pexch cqqqq ^ init c1 “ init c
definition propagate :: 'w ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
propagate w c c1 “ exch c1 “ exch c^ init c1 “ pinit cqpw :“ Trueq ^
pSome ˝ prop c1q “ pSome ˝ prop cqpw :“ while_option
pλc. Dl. P.work c l ‰ t#uzq pλc. SOME c1. Dl t. P.propagate l t c c1q pprop c wqq
definition Next :: p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ p'w, 'l , 'tq conf ñ bool where
Next c c1 “ pc “ c1q _ pDw p. recv_cap w p c c1q _
pDw ∆neg ∆data ∆self . perf_op w ∆neg ∆data ∆self c c1q _
pDw P. send_upd w P c c1q _ pDw w1. recv_upd w w1 c c1q _ pDw. propagate w c c1q
Figure 7 Transition relation of the combined progress tracker.
also iterates propagation until all worklists of a worker become empty. This gives us additional
empirical evidence that the iteration terminates on practical dataflows. Moreover, even
if the iteration were to not terminate for some worker on some dataflow (both in Timely
Dataflow and in our model), our combined protocol can faithfully capture this behavior by
not executing the propagate action, but also not any other action involving the looping worker,
thus retaining safety for the rest of the workers. Finally, any worker that has completed at
least one propagation action is considered to be initialized (by setting its init flag to True).
The Init predicate and the Next relation give rise to the familiar specification of valid
executions Spec s “ now Init s ^ alw prelates Nextq s. Safety of the combined protocol can
be described informally as follows: Every initialized worker w has some evidence for the
existence of a timestamp t at location l at any worker w1 in the frontier of its (i.e., w’s)
implications at all locations l1 reachable from l. Formally, E.rec contains the timestamps that
exist in the system:
definition Safe :: p'w, 'l , 'tq conf stream ñ bool where
Safe c “ p@w l l1 t s. init c w^ E.rec pexch cq#z pl, tq ą 0^ s P path_summary l l1 ÝÑ
pDt1 P frontier pP.imp pprop c wq l1q. t1 ď t h sq
Our main formalized result is the statement that the above predicate is an invariant.
lemma safe: Spec s ÝÑ alw pnow Safeq s
In the combined progress tracking protocol, safety guarantees that if a pointstamp is
present at an operator’s port, it is correctly reflected at every downstream port. In the
WCC example, when deployed on two workers, each operator is instantiated twice, once on
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each worker. If a pointstamp (b.3, (3,0)) is present on port b.3 of one of the instances of
operator b, the frontier at c.1 on all workers must contain a t such that t ⪯ p3, 0q. Due to the
summary between c.1 and c.2, frontiers at c.2 and b.1 must contain a t such that t ⪯ p3, 1q.
As an example, this ensures that operator b waits for each of its instances to complete the
first round propagation of all labels before it chooses the lowest label for the next round.
7 Discussion
We have presented an Isabelle/HOL formalization of Timely Dataflow’s progress tracking
protocol, including the verification of its safety. Compared to an earlier formalization by
Abadi et al. [4], our protocol is both more general, which allows it to capture behaviors
present in the implementations of Timely Dataflow and absent in Abadi et al.’s model, and
more detailed in that it explicitly models the local propagation of progress information.
Our formalization spans about 7 000 lines of Isabelle definitions and proofs. These are
roughly distributed as follows over the components we presented: basic properties of graphs
and signed multisets (1 000), exchange protocol (3 100), local propagation (1 700), combined
protocol (1 200). This is comparable in size to the TLA+ Proof System formalization by
Abadi et al., even though we formalized a significantly more detailed, complex, and realistic
variant of the progress tracking protocol. Ground to this claim is the fact that we had
actually started our formalization by porting significant parts of the TLA+ Proof System
formalization to Isabelle. We completed the proofs of their two main safety statement within
one person-week in about 1 000 lines of Isabelle (not included above). Our use of Isabelle’s
library for linear temporal logic on streams (in particular, the coinductive predicate alw)
allowed us to copy directly a vast majority of the TLA+ definitions. Additionally, Isabelle’s
mature proof automation allowed us to apply a fairly mechanical porting process to many of
the proofs. Most ported lemmas could be proved either directly by Sledgehammer [29] or by
sketching an Isar [32] proof skeleton of the main proof steps and discharging most of the
resulting subgoals with Sledgehammer.
In the subsequent development of the combined protocol, Isabelle’s locales [5] were an
important asset. By confining the exchange protocol and the local propagation each to their
own local assumptions, we were able to develop them in parallel and in their full generality.
Thus, we obtain formal models not only of the combined protocol itself but also of these
two subsystems in a generality that goes beyond what is needed for the concrete combined
instance. For example, although the combined protocol uses the could-result-in order, the
exchange protocol works for any partial order on pointstamps. Moreover, the combined
protocol always propagates until all worklists are empty, even though the local propagation’s
safety supports small-step propagation, resulting in a more fine-grained safety property via
work_vacant.
In our formalization, we make extensive use of signed multisets [8]. The alternative
(used in the TLA+ Proof System formalization), would be to use integer-valued functions
instead. The signed multiset type additionally captures a finite domain assumption, which it
was convenient not to carry around explicitly and in particular simplified reasoning about
summations. The expected downside of having separate types for function-like (mset) and
set-like (antichain) objects was the need to insert explicit type conversions and to transfer
properties across these conversions. Both complications were to some extent alleviated by
Lifting and Transfer [19].
Progress tracking is only a small, albeit arguably the most intricate part of Timely
Dataflow. Verifying its safety is an important first step towards our long-term goal of
developing a verified, executable variant of Timely Dataflow and using it as a framework
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for the verification of efficient and scalable stream processing algorithms. More modest
next steps are to prove the local propagation algorithm’s termination and to make our
formalization executable. We have made first steps towards the latter goal, by creating a
functional, executable variant of the local propagation’s transition relation [12]. This allowed
us to compare our formalized propagation algorithm to the one implemented in Rust. We
found that their input–output behavior coincides on all example dataflows accompanying
the Rust implementation, confirming our model’s faithfulness. We are working on including
the exchange protocol in this comparative testing, which poses a challenge because of the
protocol’s distributed nature.
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